THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION IN THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS
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I
The rules concerning the construction of contracts are so well established as to require but brief attention. The object of construction is to ascertain the intention of the
parties. That intention is to be determined from the language used in the instrument
and not from any surmises that the parties intended certain conditions which they
failed to express. Where there is no ambiguity in the language used, from that, and
that alone, may the intention of the parties be gathered.'
In the construction of contracts for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the
parties the court will endeavor, by extrinsic evidence of such facts as the parties had
in view, to place itself as nearly as possible in their position, so that it may understand
the language used in the sense intended by them.2

N THE first of these two statements, it is said to be the object of the
court to discover the intention of the parties. On the other hand,
that intention is to be determined solely "from the language used
in the instrument."3 But by reason of the abstractive nature of language
any writing is bound to express actual intent with some degree of inadequacy. All meanings, as Wigmore says, are in some manner "subjective

and personal";4 and it is always true in some sense-if it is actual intent we
are after-that the parties have "themselves locked up the idea in the
words" and so "themselves must furnish the key to unlock it."S Why,
then, if it is looking for motive and intention, does the court exclude all
evidence but that of the writing itself, which is necessarily inadequate
evidence of motive and intention? It looks as if, as Williston puts it,
"the court is endeavoring to find as a controlling factor what ...may
be wholly ineffectual ' 6 or as if the court is declining to use the means of
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finding what it is presumably endeavoring to find. Nor is the discrepancy
alleviated by the use of phrases like "expressed intent ' 7 or "the true in'8
tent of the contracting parties as expressed in the language of the policy."
The court is either looking for intent or it is not; and if, as the case cited
above declares, it is looking for intent, there is at least on the face of it a
certain oddity in the exclusion of evidence relevant to the determination
of intent.
As between the first and second statements, moreover, a second difficulty emerges. According to one series of opinions it is a primary rule of
interpretation that, unless a writing is ambiguous, construction is to be
based solely upon the writing itself without the aid of any extrinsic evidence. In another group of cases, deriving from equally well-established
precedent, it is said that "the court will endeavor, by extrinsic evidence
of such facts as the parties had in view, to place itself as nearly as possible in their position, so that it may understand the language used in the
sense intended by them." 9 But the two doctrines are manifestly incompatible. In the one case the court takes the language of a writing at its
face value, admitting no extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining
its meaning. In the other the court attempts to reconstruct the position
of the parties at the time and place of the writing, admitting evidence
of surrounding circumstances for the purpose of determining such meaning as would attach to the writing at that time and place and under those
attendant circumstances.
It would appear, then, that at least in two respects the primary rule
concerning the interpretation of contracts needs clarification. (I am not
concerned here with the various subordinate rules of construction, such
as the rule that every part of a contract should be given effect if possible,
etc. Such problems as those principles present are wholly dependent upon
the issue involved in the statement of the primary rule or rules.) In the
first place, the relation of construction to the determination of actual
intent needs to be re-examined. Is it true that "in construing a written
7 Ibid.
8 The Western and Southern Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 366 Ill. 240, 242, 8 N.E.
(2d) 644 (19.37).
9This series of cases rests ultimately on the authority of Doyle v. Teas, 4 Scam. (Ial.) 202,
255 (1843). "We find the courts, in all cases, endeavoring by extrinsic evidence, to place them-

selves, as far as possible, in the position of the contending parties, so that they may understand the language used, in the sense intended by the parties using it." Cf. Field v. Leiter, 118
Ill. 17, 26, 6 N.E. 877 (1886); 'Vhalen v. Stephens, 193 Ill. 121, 134, 6i N.E. 921 (Igoi); Conway Co. v. City of Chicago, 274 Ill. 369, 374, 113 N.E. 703 (igi6); McLean County Coal Co. v.
City of Bloomington, 234 Ill. 9 o , 96, 84 N.E. 64o (i9o8).
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instrument the great object is to arrive at the intention of the parties"?"

Or does the occurrence of that aim coincide, as is suggested in Benjamin
v. McConnell,"' with the occurrence of ambiguous language in the writing
to be interpreted? And if, as most of the cases indicate, the former maxim
holds, though we shall have to examine its meaning more closely later,
what is the basis for the exclusion of evidence of intention? Secondly, if
extrinsic evidence is excluded in construing a contract, what becomes
of the principle that the court will "endeavor to place itself in the position of the parties"? In some cases, it is true, the latter rule is stated
as secondary, i.e., as functioning only when the language of the contract
is ambiguous." In other opinions, however, it is clearly stated that the
court will endeavor in all cases to reproduce the circumstances in which
the contract was executed; 3 and in still other instances, it is not clear
from the language of the opinion whether the rule is operating as a pri4
mary or an auxiliary principle.
II

When, as in the cases cited, it is stated, first, that the object of construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties, and, secondly, that the
court will exclude extrinsic evidence bearing on such intent, it is sometimes added that the restriction involved in the second statement is
drawn in order to save the parol evidence rule, i.e., "the well settled rule
that prior or contemporaneous conversations are not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written agreement." 5 It is said that:
10 McLean County Coal Co. v. City of Bloomington, 234 Ill.90, 97, 84 N.E. 64o (igo8);
Peoria and Pekin Union Ry. Co. v. Tamplin, i56 Ill.
285, 4 o N.E. g6o (1895).
x14 Gilm. (Ill.) 536, 545 (1847).

2Barrett v. Stow, 15 Ill.
423, 424 (1854): "'Uponthis subject the contract as written is not
specific, and in order to understand the meaning of the parties, it is proper to ascertain such
extrinsic facts as the parties had in view at the time the contract was made, in order to ascertain their true meaning." Street v. Chicago Wharfmg Co., x5711R. 6o5,613,41 N.E. iio8, 1112
(i895).
"3Doyle v. Teas, 4 Scam. (Ill.) 202, 255 (1843). Conway Co. v. City of Chicago, 274 Ill.
369, 374, 113 N.E. 703'(916): "In construing contracts, courts will always seek to discover
and give effect to the intention of the parties, and for the purpose of ascertaining such intention will endeavor to place themselves in the position of the contracting parties, so that they
may understand their language in the sense in which they used it." Cf. Hoffer Oil Corp. v.
Hughes, 16 S.W. (2d) 9oi, 9o4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929): "Whether the language of the contract
be ambiguous or not, in ascertaining the intention of the parties, the surrounding facts and
circumstances and the purposes -sought to be accomplished by its making should be considered."
o
X4McLean County Coal Co. v. City of Bloomington, 234 Ill.
9 ,96, 84 N.E. 640 (xgo8).
i Tyer v. Caldwell, 114 Okla. 13, 15, 242 Pac. 760, 761 (1925).
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while the intention of the parties is sought, it can be found only in their expression in
the writing. In effect, it is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in
the writing that controls. The obligation of a contractor depends upon his expressed,
not his actual intention. . .. The parties are bound by the language used regardless of
their intent. The terms of the writing are exclusive, and, therefore, a contract may
have a different meaning from that which either party supposed it to have.... Otherwise, there would be a disregard of the well settled rule forbidding the introduction of parol
6
evidene to contradictthe terms of a written contract.,

As a matter of fact, it is of course not "written" but "integrated" agreements for which the parol evidence rule operates. If an agreement is
written but not integrated it is beyond the scope of the rule; and should
an agreement be integrated though not written (a theoretical though unlikely possibility) it would come within the scope of the rule. An agreement is integrated, according to the definition of the Restatement, "where
the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete
expression of the agreement." 7 What determines integration, therefore,
is not some particular kind of writing, but the assent of the parties to this
writing (or, in the rare case, these spoken words) as the full and complete
expression of their agreement. "If such assent is manifested the writing
may be a letter, telegram, or other informal document." The parol evidence rule, then, is a rule applying to the class of integrated agreements.
If, therefore, the exclusion of evidence of actual intent is effected to save
the parol evidence rule, such exclusion will evidently apply only to the
class of integrated agreements, to which the parol evidence rule applies;
and in all other cases the court will be free to admit evidence of actual
intent-if such intent be in fact the object of its search.
It would appear, therefore, that there are in' fact two primary rules
for the interpretation of contracts: one which holds for all cases to which
the parol evidence rule applies and one holding for all other cases. It
would seem, further, from the weight of authority in the cases, that in
the former class the primary rule operates to the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence where the meaning of the instrument is dear, but gives way to a
subordinate rule, admitting such evidence, when the language of the writing is ambiguous. Such a multiple standard theory appears on the face
of it to offer both the source and the solution of our difficulties; and an
examination of the theory as Williston formulates it should shed some
light, direct or indirect, on both the questions of the preceding section.
6 Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taubel, 113 N.J.L. 605, 609, 175 Aft. 55, 57

(1935) (italics added). Cf. Kentucky Wagon Co. v. People's Supply Co., 77 S.C. 92, 57 S.E.
676 (igo6).
17 Rest., Contracts, § 228; 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 631-3 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf. id., at §§ 603,
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Our immediate question is: Are there in fact two dearly separated classes
of contracts to which two dearly distinguishable standards of interpretation apply? And is there within one of those standards a dear distinction
between a rule for the construction of dear and unambiguous language and
a rule for the construction of language that is not dear and unambiguous?
It should be added that the present question hinges primarily on that
aspect of the parol evidence rule which concerns ambiguity. Neither the
problem of the relation of integration to the admissibility of evidence of
collateral agreements nor the problem of the relation of integration to
questions of mistake is material to the present issue. It is apparently the
principle that where there is a writing "the province of construction lies
wholly within the domain of ambiguity"'" which gives rise to the distinction between two classes of cases-or conversely, it is the exclusion of
parol evidence in cases where the meaning of the writing is "dear" that
seems to necessitate the establishment of a special standard for agreements concerning which such exclusion may be effected. What Wigmore
calls the "dear-meaning" rule' 9 as opposed to the rule on collateral agreements or mistake is, therefore, the only fraction of the parol evidence rule
under consideration in the present paper; and by "parol evidence rule"
I shall here mean the rule that parol testimony (or testimony of prior
or contemporaneous agreements) is not admissible to alter the plain
meaning of an integrated writing. According to the multiple standard
theory, contracts are divided with reference to interpretation into two
classes. "In one division must be put not only formal contracts such as
sealed instruments and negotiable paper, but also contracts or agreements
where the parties have manifested assent not merely to the terms of their
agreement but to a writing or other fixed symbol as a memorial or integration of that agreement. In this class must also be put contracts of which
the law requires a written memorandum ..... In a second division must
be put all other contracts. ' 20 To the second class a standard of reasonable expectation is applied,2" and to the first class a standard of limited
usage,' except that where the result of applying that standard is ambigu18Norfolk Motor Exch. v. Grubb,

152 Va. 471, 478, 147 S.E. 214, 216 (1929).

195 Wigmore, Evidence § 2462 (2d ed. 1923).
20 3 Williston, Contracts § 604 (rev. ed. i936).
21 "A standard of reasonable expectation, which would attach to words or other manifestations of intention the meaning which the party employing them should reasonably have apprehended that they would convey to the other party." Id., at § 6o3; Rest., Contracts §§ 227,

233 (1932).

-"A standard of limited usage, which would attach the meaning given to language in a
particular locality, or by a sect or those engaged in a particular occupation, or by an alien
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ous the standard otherwise restricted to the second class becomes applicable here.23
Presumably, since one standard would be easier to administer than two,
there is some reason, in principle or precedent, for the multiplication of
standards; and, as I have suggested, it is primarily the authority of the
parol evidence rule that seems to provide that reason. Williston says:
Doubtless it would be simpler if one standard of interpretation could be asserted for
all manifestations of intention forming contracts or relating to their formation, but
the parol evidence rule makes it clear that this cannot be done. This rule denies effect,

where there is a writing to which the rule is applicable, to certain manifestations of intention which are operative in cases where the parol evidence rule is not applicable. It
follows that there must be at least two standards by which the meaning of contracts
or agreements must be tested.24
Putting off for a moment the question where, if anywhere, within the
class of all contracts the operation of the parol evidence rule effects a
division, or what difference, if any, subsists between the standards operative in the sub-classes thus created, one may object, I think, that the

above argument, in abstraction from the specific subject matter to which
it is applied, is formally very uncertain. To be sure, the ultimate question
is the practical one whether the results in two kinds of cases are so different as to demand a difference in the formulation of the principles implied.
Still, the multiplication of rules, where such multiplication is formally

unnecessary, is merely confusing-so that the multiplication, if it is to be
accepted, needs logical justification as against the simpler and hence more
convenient alternative. And the lack of such justification would seem to

indicate the inconvenience (though not of course the impossibility) of
such a plural rule compared with the simpler formulation. With this
pragmatic issue in mind, then, we may inquire into the logic of the
present situation. If one is looking for a rule covering a certain operation
in a given field, and one discovers that there is a related rule relevant to
the operation in question which restricts, within a certain portion of the
field, the material on which the rule sought might operate, one infers that
population or those using a local dialect." 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 6o3, 604 (rev. ed. 1936);
Rest., Contracts §§ 227, 230 (1932).
607 (rev. ed. 1936); Rest., Contracts § 231 (1932).
233 Williston, Contracts §§ 6o,
243 Williston, Contracts § 6o3 (rev. ed. 1936). This statement is added in the revised edition; but it seems to crystallize in explicit form a connection implicit in the whole discussion.
Cf. the argument of § 607, where two kinds of cases furnishing "exceptions" to the standard of
reasonable expectation are given: "If the promisor's justifiable belief were the standard which
the law adopted it would be applicable to every case. That it is not is evident from the two
exceptions mentioned." Formally this argument is identical with or closely analogous to that
cited above.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

the general rule becomes under such and such circumstances (namely
under the circumstances delimiting the portion of the field to which the
correlative rule applies) totally or partially inoperative. But solely from
the existence of such exceptions in the operation of a rule is one bound to
infer that there is no such general rule for the field in question, or that
there are two totally separate rules for the two sub-fields? Did one in
fact so correlate difference in rule (or related rule) with rigid division of
the field, one would have to set up at least a third division among contracts, corresponding to the cases (involving the use of codes, etc.) in
which a mutual standard is accepted- -as opposed to the standards both
of reasonable expectation and of limited usage. Such cases may be limited
in number, but they do constitute an exception; and if it is true that rules
are universal for the members of the field they cover, in such fashion that
where there is an exception there is necessarily a separate rule for the
separate field thus created, then such a division would certainly be demanded. Williston does not, however, insist on the separation from all
other agreements of agreements effectively using a mutual language; and
it therefore seems fair to infer that the parallel argument in the case of the
parol evidence rule is insufficient, taken alone, to necessitate the division
of the total class of contracts into two sub-classes differentiated by their
subjection to different standards of interpretation. It might just as well
be the case that the parol evidence rule delimits a set of excepted cases
under a general principle--just as the occurrence of ambiguity is said to
do under the standard applied to integrated agreements. To be sure,
Williston's statement of the variant results that actually follow from the
application of his two standards constitutes his strongest argumentand I shall consider it more fully below. At present I am concerned, however, with the first and formal argument; and my point is simply that the
necessity for a dual standard does not follow analytically from the mere
existence of a rule "excluding certain manifestations of intention" in a
certain class of cases. So far, then, logic does not, as Williston suggests,
compel us to choose the more complex formulation. And, unless we find
some other reason, convenience would therefore dictate the adoption of
a single standard.
It is further asserted, however, that between the class of agreements to
which the parol evidence rule does not apply and the class to which it
applies there is a material difference with respect to the relation of the
words used to the parties using them and the objects designated. It is
held, in other words, that in these two groups of cases language plays two
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different roles and is therefore to be interpreted by two correspondingly
divergent standards.
In an ordinary oral contract or one made by correspondence, the minds of the
parties are not primarily addressed to the symbols which they are using; they are considering the things for which the symbols stand. Where, however, they incorporate
their agreement into a writing they have attempted more than to assent by means of
symbols to certain things, they have assented to the writing as the adequate expression
of the things to which they agree 25
But on the other hand, it has been said that "in every case, the words must
be translated into things and facts by parol evidence, '"26 or that the process
of "turning signs and symbols into their equivalent realities" is always
"to some extent" a necessary one;2 7 and thus it would appear that symbols
have in no case an intrinsic significance apart from their designative function. Such statements, as the preceding one (that words must be translated into things or signs turned into realities), are, it is true, inaccurate;
for Blackacre has never been to court, although its designation, "Blackacre," appears there frequently. But surely it is true that the court, having
before it certain symbols in a certain language, endeavors in all cases to
determine the rules of that language--whether of country, trade, region
or even, in some cases, individual-with precision and completeness sufficient to guarantee with a reasonable degree of certainty the identification
by a reasonable person using that language of the objects or events designated by the symbols in question. The court neither brings Blackacre
into the courtroom nor goes to Blackacre; but it does attempt to connect
"Blackacre" with a set of descriptive words sufficiently dear and complete to fulfill the following condition: that if a reasonable person should
hear and understand the conjunction of that set of descriptive words with
the word "Blackacre" and should then, perceiving a place fitting the
description, call it Blackacre, the place so designated would very probably
be Blackacre. "The minds of the parties" may, indeed, have been focused
somewhat more consciously, in the case of an integrated as against a nonintegrated agreement, upon linguistic as opposed to factual problems;
but the minds of the parties are no more perceptibly in the courtroom
than is Blackacre. What the court has before it in any case is not a mental
process but a set of sentences-whether in an integrated writing, a nonintegrated writing or writings, or a report of spoken words; and the task
of interpretation in any of those cases consists in determining univocally,
2s

6
27

3 Williston, Contracts § 6o6 (rev. ed. 1936).

Holmes, J., in Doherty v. Hill, 144Mass. 465, 468, ixN.E. 58I, 582 (I88I).
Cardozo, J., in Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N.Y. 138, 143, 123 N.E. 139, 141 (1g).
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in the given language, rules for the correlation of the symbols used with
the objects they designate. As regards the relation of symbols to things
symbolized there is no material difference between an integration and any
other group of sentences; and the semantical argument, like the formal,
appears insufficient to establish the need for a multiple standard of construction.
But even if the validity of both the preceding arguments were granted
-if one admitted the necessity of dividing all contracts, with respect to
standards of interpretation, into two classes, a division based on the demand of the parol evidence rule would not correspond to the division
that Williston actually makes. Yet it was the authority of the parol evidence rule, as we have seen, that was said to demand the division.
The parol evidence rule applies to integrated agreements;2 and a division of contracts into two classes should, if based on the scope of that rule,
include in one sub-class all integrated agreements and only integrated
agreements, and in the other sub-class no integrated agreements but all
non-integrated agreements. Actually, however, the line is drawn between the class of all agreements which are either integrated or such that
a written memorandum is required by law and the class of all other agreements. 29 The first class thus contains some non-integrated agreements,
while the second class does not contain all non-integrated agreements.
The criterion of "integration," it is true, is not precisely determined. Although the definition of an integrated agreement as one "where the parties
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression
of the agreement"' 3 seems at first sight reasonably dear, Williston's discussion of "intent" as the criterion of integration appears to the present
writer at least to leave very uncertain the location of the line or shadow
of a line that is said to separate integrated contracts from all others. 3'
But wherever the line apparently demanded by the parol evidence rule
be drawn, it is clear that that line is not identical with the line drawn
with respect to interpretation between two classes of contracts. For we
are told explicitly that the memorandum required by the statute of frauds
"need not necessarily be an integration or memorial of the contract" ;32
and we are told explicitly that such memoranda are included with integrated agreements in the first class of contracts. The reason given, moreover, for such inclusion (that "the purpose of the law in requiring written
183 Williston, Contracts §§ 631, 633 (rev. ed. 1936); Cf. §§ 6o3, 6o4. Rest., Contracts § 238
(1932).
29

3 Williston, Contracts § 604 (rev. ed. 1936).

3o Ibid.

3 Id., at § 633.

3 Id., at § 6o4.
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evidence can be satisfied only if the same standard is applied to memoranda under the statute as is applicable to written contracts")33 suggests
very forcibly that policy rather than theory may dictate the division.
Nor do the cases cited by Williston fall into classes corresponding to a
clear theoretical division. If the line between integrated and non-integrated agreements can be traced at all, it would certainly seem that an
insurance policy is normally an integrated writing; but Bird v. St. Pail
34
F. & M. Ins. Co.,
Davis v. Highway Motor Underwriters3s and Granger
v. N. J. Ins. Co.

36

are instances of insurance cases cited to illustrate the

rule for "informal" contracts-that is, in Williston's use of "informal"
in this context, for contracts which are neither integrated nor such that
a written memorandum is required by law. The rule stated in those cases
is, indeed, Williston's "informal" rule-the standard of reasonable expectation; but when a rule is enunciated in the context of a case belonging
to the class to which that rule is said not to apply, its citation scarcely
strengthens the argument.3 7 And conversely, there are citations for the
other rule (as Logan-Long v. Roger Laudati)38 which seem very uncertainly to fall under the class of agreements integrated or requiring written
memoranda. Indeed, as we shall observe more closely below, the standards stated for the two classes resemble one another so closely that it is
very possible (as in the instance of Clark v. Lillie)39 to cite the same opinion in illustration of both rules.
It looks, therefore, as if it could hardly be the parol evidence rule
which necessitates the dual standard--since the classes to which the two
standards are said to apply fail to correspond to the division effected by
that rule.
The crux of Williston's argument, however, lies in his statement of the
kinds of cases in which the results reached by applying the local standard
differ from those reached by applying the standard of reasonable expecta33 Ibid.
34 224 N.Y. 47, 12o N.E. 86 (igz8).
36 o8 Cal. App. 290, 291 Pac. 698 (i93o).

3S 12o

Neb. 734, 235 N.W. 325 (193).

37See also Danforth v. Chandler, 237 Mass. 518, 13o N.E. io5 (i921), a statute of frauds
case here cited under the rule for the second class of contracts.
3S52 R.I. 250, i6o At. I99 (1932) cited by Williston as an example of the secondary rule
that "the standard for oral agreements applies where integrated, contracts appear ambiguous."
The court there says: "First of all it should be noted that the letter does not purport to contain all the terms of the agreement." Cf. Deutsch v. Pratt, x49 Mass. 415, 420, 21 N.E. 1072,
1074 (i889), cited 3 Williston § 6o6 as an example of the principle that contracts of the first
class exist even though the parties may attach different meanings to the language; Preston v.
Luck, L.R. 27 Ch. D. 497 (1884).
39 39 Vt. 405 (1867).
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tion-for unless there are important practical differences in the results
actually issuing from the use of the two standards, the duality would certainly appear superfluous. He states:
The results reached by applying the local standard are the same as would be
reached by applying the standard applicable where no memorial is made of the agreement, or apparent agreement, except in two cases(r) where there is such a justifiable difference of belief concerning the sense in which
the parties used the words as would prevent the existence of a contract had the
negotiations been informal.
(2) where the sense which the promisor reasonably supposed the other party would
attach to his words is one which neither normal usage, nor local or technical usage
justifies.40

The second exception is dearly based on policy and presents no problem
with regard to standards of interpretation. The mutual standard is arbitrarily excluded for reasons of policy operating from beyond the limits
of any theory of interpretation. It is the first exception, then, that is
crucial. Are there in fact cases in which "justifiable beliefs" of the parties
sufficient to establish a contract "had the negotiations been informal"
are rendered ineffective by the operation of the standard of limited usage?
For the cases cited by Williston in this context the answer is dearly negative. In every case the contrast is made not between the "justifiable beliefs" of the parties as to the meaning of the language used and the usual
or local meaning, but between their actual beliefs about such meanings
and the beliefs they might reasonably have been supposed to hold. The
contrast, in other words, is one between actual intention on the one hand
and the meaning of language as a reasonable man would understand it
on the other. It is not the justifiable beliefs of the parties but their actual
beliefs which are ineffective-and those beliefs are ineffective just because
they are not justifiable-that is, because the parties did not actually give
to the words they used a meaning which could reasonably be given them.
In the case most fully cited here it was said "that where a written agreement has been signed .... the fact that the plaintiff has put an erroneous
construction upon it, and insisted that it included what it did not include,
does not prevent there being a contract."'4' It is dear that it is here the
actual understanding of the plaintiff which is contrasted to what he ought
reasonably to have understood by the language used. The same contrast
appears in every other case cited.42 For instance, in Sawyer v. Hovey it
403
WiUiston, Contracts § 607 (rev. ed. z936); Cf. §§ 6o6, 6io.
4' Preston v. Luck, L.R. 27 Ch. D. 497 (1884).
42 Sawyer v. Hovey, 3 Allen (Mass.) 331, 333 (1862), mistake of expression not proved

clearly enough for reformation; Citizens' Tel. Co. v. Newport, 188 Ky. 629, 224 S.W. z87
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is said that "if parties understand an agreement differently, and neither
of them makes known to the other his construction of it, and it is afterwards reduced to writing and duly executed, they are bound, in equity,
as well as at law, by the terms of the written instrument, which in such
cases is to be construed by the court." 43 Or again, in Woburn Nat'l Bank
v. Woods: "A party cannot escape the natural and reasonable interpretation which must be put on what he says and does, by showing that his
words were used and his acts done with a different and undisclosed intention." 44 And in Phillip v. Gallant Church, C.J., declared:
In the recent case of Smith v. Hughes, cited by the counsel for the defendant, Blackburn, J. lays down the correct rule which is, I think, applicable to this case. He says:
"If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable
man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party,
and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus
conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other
party's terms."4S
The above contrast, moreover, between actual intention and the meaning of language as a reasonable man would understand it (or expect it to
be understood) is equally to be made in Williston's second class of contracts. For it is the standard of reasonable expectation, not an individual
standard which is applied in such cases; and actual intent is there just as
ineffective as in the first class of contracts. The rule is clearly stated in

Clark v. Lillie:
The law will presume that the defendant meant what his language by its terms and
under the circumstances in which it was used would fairly be understood to mean, and
this presumption is a matter of law and not to be rebutted by proof that he intended
something more or different which he made no attempt to express and which the
plaintiff neither understood nor had reason to understand.46
It is evidently true for all cases, therefore, and not only, as Williston
holds, for a restricted group of cases, that "a contract may be created
(i92o); Deutsch v. Pratt, r49 Mass. 415, 21 N.E. 1072 (i889); Mechaber v. Pittle, 270 Mass.
193, 170 N.E. 52 (1930), individual or mutual standard does not control; Illinois Fuel Co. v.
Mobile Co., 319 Mo. 899, 92o, 8 S.W. (2d) 834 (1928) words apparently creating joint or joint

and several obligation not effectual by "practical construction"; Woburn Nat'l Bank v. Woods,
77 N.H. 172, 89 Atl. 491 (1914); Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 256 (1875); Sanders v. Cooper,
115 N.Y. 279, 22 N.E. 212 (1889), action on insurance policy as if reformed improper; suit
necessary; Brainerd v. N.Y. Central Railroad Co., 242 N.Y. 125, x5I N.E. 152 (1926); Johnston v. Patterson, 114 Pa. 398, 6 Atl. 746 (1886); Schunecht v. Robers, 192 Wis. 275, 212 N.W.
657 (1927). The only case in which the contrast is not clear is Henrietta Mills v. Comm'r, 52 F.
(2d) 931 (C.C.A. 4 th 193I). The question in that case, however, was one of taxation, not contracts, and it is not strictly comparable with the other cases.
43 3 Allen (Mass.) 331, 333 (i862).
4s 62 N.Y. 256, 263 (1875).
1 77 N.H. 172, 175, 89 At. 491, 492 (1914).
4639 Vt. 405 (1867).
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though each party attached a different meaning to the language used, if
he had no reason to suppose that his own meaning was not shared by the
other party."47 Williston does insist, it is true, that in the class of agreements including integrations contracts may exist where parties attach
different meanings to the language "no matter how reasonable may have
been the belief of each. ' ' 48 But this qualification seems to me to be flatly
contradicted by the qualification of the sentence quoted just above, which,
deprived of its double negative, reads: "A contract may be created though
each party attached a different meaning to the language used, if he had
reason to .suppose that his meaning was shared by the other party"49-if, in
other words, the standard of reasonable expectation could be effectively
applied to the language used. But a case, on the other hand, in which the
reasonable (as opposed to the actual) beliefs of the parties with regard
to the meaning of the terms used by them should prove ineffective and
in which at the same time there should be room for a reasonable interpretation by the court seems practically and logically very close to inconceivable. To talk about a man's "justifiable beliefs" and to talk about
conduct on his part such that "a reasonable man would believe that he
was assenting to the terms proposed" seems to me clearly to be talking
about one and the same norm in a slightly different metaphor; and to
render the first factor ineffective while giving effect to the second would
seem to mean enforcing at one and the same time two directly contradictory principles.
There is, of course, the possibility, as cases like Domeyer v. O'Connellso
suggest, that it is more than simply evidence of actual intent which, for
integrated contracts, the parol evidence rule operates to exclude. Certainly some of the cases insist on the exclusion of all extrinsic evidence
where the language of a writing is "plain."
When the question is one of the interpretation of a contract, entire in itself in all
particulars, it is only when different inferences may fairly be drawn as to the meaning
and effect of the written language used, that the relation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are to be considered by the jury in arriving at their intention.51
It is clear, however, that if no evidence whatsoever of surrounding circumstances be admitted, it is the normal as opposed to the local standard
which automatically becomes effective in every case-since evidence of
47 3

Williston, Contracts § 6o6 (rev. ed. 1936).
(Italics added).

49 Ibid.

49Ibid.

so0364 Ill. 467, 4 N.E. (2d) 830 (1936).
' St.
1923).
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surrounding circumstances is necessary for the determination of trade
or local meaning. On the face of it the phrase "white selvage" denotes,
quite unambiguously, white selvage, and unless evidence of usage be admitted it cannot be interpreted as designating what in non-trade terms
would be dark gray selvage.52 If no extrinsic evidence be admitted to
"alter plain meanings," a case like Kentucky Wagon Co. v. People'sSupply
Co.,s 3 in which normal as opposed to local meaning is insisted on, is dearly
right. If, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence be admitted, not to alter
meanings but to determine them (and both Williston and the Restatement
declare emphatically for its admission), s the line between the alleged two
standards fades on two scores. For it may be maintained, first, as in
Marks v. Cowdin, that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is a matter
of degree, not of kind: "Parol evidence bearing on actual intent is a
limiting case of extrinsic evidence which is excluded on grounds of policy."ss And it may be held, secondly, that although as a matter of policy
the explicit exclusion of evidence of intent may perhaps be peculiarly
important in the first class of contracts (where there is an integration or
where a writing is required by law), such evidence is actually irrelevant
for any type of agreement s 6 For in the second class of agreement it is a
standard of reasonable expectation, not of actual expectation, that is
applied; and the actual intention of the parties with regard to the lan52 Mitchell

v. Henry, L.R. 15 Ch.D. 181 (i88o).

1 77 S.C. 92, 57 S.E. 676 (igo6): "Conceding it was the usual practice of insurance companies in general to write policies containing the three-four clause, such practice could not be
shown for the purpose of contradicting words in agreements entered into by third parties, which
are free from ambiguity or equivocation; and in their ordinary and usual acceptation have but

one meaning, as in the case under consideration. This would infringe upon the well settled doctrine that parol testimony is inadmissible for the purpose of contradicting the terms of a
written instrument."
54 3 Williston, Contracts § 629 (rev. ed. x936); Rest., Contracts § 230. Cf. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2470 (2d ed. 1923).
SS226 N.Y. 138, 143, 123 N.E. 139, 140 (1919): "In thus identifying the position we are not
importing into the contract a new element of promise. We are turning signs and symbols into
their equivalent realities. This must always be done to some extent, no matter how many are
the identifying tokens. In every case, the words must be translated into things and facts by
parol evidence. (Holmes, J., in Doherty v. Hill, supra, p. 468; Mead v. Parker, supra, p. 41S:
4 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2454). How far the process may be extended is a question of
degree (Doherty v. Hill, supra,p. 469). We exclude the writing that refers us to spoken words
or promise. We admit the one that bids us ascertain a place or a relation by comparison of the
description with some 'manifest, external, and continuing fact' (Doherty v. Hill, supra, p.
469). The statute must not be pressed to the extreme of a literal and rigid logic. Some compromise is inevitable if words are to fulfill their function as symbols of things and of ideas."
s56
See section Tf infra; Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417
(1899). Evidence of actual intention is relevant, Holmes maintains, only (as in some cases in
the interpretation of will) where it bears on the objective meaning of the language.
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guage they use may-even though evidence of it be forbidden only for a
restricted group of cases-prove just as ineffective in any other case as
it does in those cases in which the parol evidence rule is said to operate.
The rule, in other words, becomes trivial in the sense that it excludes, for
a certain class of cases (and a class which, as was suggested above, is at
best very uncertainly delimited) a factor which is practically ineffective
or irrelevant in all cases.
From all these considerations it would appear that a clear line between
two classes of contracts governed by distinct standards is difficult to
draw. But the alleged relation, in the first class of contracts (in which
there is an integration or a writing is required by law) between a primary
and a secondary standard is equally perplexing. Where, we are told,
(and only where) the application of a standard of limited usage produces
an "ambiguous" result, the standard of reasonable expectation is applied.5 7 It thus appears that having admitted enough evidence of surrounding circumstances to make a local or trade or technical meaning
effective we fall back on a vestige of the "clear meaning" rule for another
distinction apparently as rigid as the one discarded. In view of this distinction it becomes necessary to inquire into the meaning of "plain meanings" in order to ascertain at what point the standard of reasonable expectation is said to re-enter. As an instance of that standard Williston
considers in this connection the rule that "when the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties to it, that
sense is to prevail against either party in which he had reason to suppose
the other understood it."' ' In Inmnan Manufacturing Co. v. Cereal Co.
(quoted at length by Williston) McLain, J., in order to elucidate the meaning of the rule as it occurs in the Iowa code, cites a long series of cases
illustrating its use as a common law rule. He concludes:
An examination of the cases already cited win show that the common-law rule has
been limited in its application to cases in which there has been a controversy arising
under a contract in ambiguous language, or in which some mistake or uncertainty has
appeared with reference to the subject-matter to which the language is sought to be
applied. The rule has never been recognized as authorizing the interpretation of plain

and unambiguous language of a written instrument in accordance with any other
meaning than that indicated by the words used in the instrument.59
Similarly, the court declared in another Iowa case:
The principle that, when the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had
§ 607 (rev. ed. i936); Rest., Contracts § 231 (1932).
Williston, Contracts § 607 (rev. ed. i936).

S7 3 Williston, Contracts
s8 3

9 133 Iowa 71, 75, iio

N.W.

287, 288

(1907).
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reason to suppose the other party understood it, has no application to contract
promises couched and framed in plain and unambiguous words.06o
But what are "plain and unambiguous words"? Outside court rooms and
legal treatises words are usually said to be unambiguous when a reasonable person acquainted with the natural language in which the words occur
(in this case English) would without hesitation interpret them in the
same way in which any other reasonable person similarly equipped would
interpret them. That is, the words in a writing are unambiguous when
simply by their occurrence in the document they suggest rules of application so clearly that no alternative to the one obvious meaning presents
itself. Suppose, however, we accept that interpretation of the phrase
"plain and unambiguous words." We should then assent, I suppose, to
dicta like that of Strong v. Carver:
It is a familiar principle that, where a written contract is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning, proof of the conditions and circumstances under which it was made,
and of the facts to which it relates, may be introduced to apply it properly to the
subject-matter, and to ascertain the true meaning of its language as it was used by the
parties ..... But this rule applies only where the meaning of the writing would otherwise be doubtful. It cannot be applied to contradict the plain meaning of the words.61
In other words, we are back with the rule for the exclusion of all extrinsic
evidence where the meaning of words appears unambiguous on the face
of the document alone--and it becomes necessary, as was indicated above,
to give effect exclusively to the normal meaning of language as opposed
to any special meaning which might be shown by evidence of usage or
other "surrounding circumstances."
If, on the other hand, as Williston agrees with the majority of more
recent cases in insisting,6 2 evidence of usage is always to be admitted,
the word "unambiguous" is evidently not to be taken as meaning plain
in the context of the writing alone, but plain in the light of the surrounding circumstances. It becomes necessary, that is, to add a further qualification to the common-sense definition of "unambiguous
words." Words are said to be unambiguous when a reasonable person, acquainted with the natural language in which the words occur,
and with the circumstances (of professional, geographical,social, or in some
cases even individual linguistic custom) under which the words were used,
would without hesitation interpret them in the same way in which any
other reasonable person similarly equipped would interpret them. That
60Comptograph Co. v. Burroughs, 179 Iowa 83, 1oi, i59 N.W. 465, 474 (1916).

6, 197 Mass. 53, 59, 83 N.E. 328,
623

330 (1907).

Williston, Contracts § 629 (rev. ed. 1936); Rest., Contracts §

230 (1932).
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is to say: words are unambiguous if the linguistic rules holding at the
time and place in which the words were used are sufficiently well determined so that it is clear in what sense anyone using such words at such
time and place would have reason to suppose another person understood
them. The dictum of the court in the Inman or Comptograph cases, then,
gives us the following information:
The principle that, when the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the parties, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he had
reason to suppose the other party understood it, has no application to contract
promises couched and framed in words such that, for conditions similar in essentials
to those of the actually contracting parties, the sense in which one person would have
reason to suppose another person understood those words is, to an adequate degree of
certainty, already determined.
The standard of reasonable expectation, in other words, is not to be
applied to agreements to which it has already been successfully applied.
That the restriction of the "secondary" standard to "ambiguous"
writings is in fact thus trivial is confirmed by the language of the cases.
In Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank &" Trust Co. v. Taubel, e.g., the court is
painfully involved in the endeavor to follow the distinctions made by
Williston and the Restatement. The passage relevant to the present question reads as follows:
The standard of interpretation of an integrated agreement supported by the weight
of modem authority, is the meaning that would be attached to the integration by a
reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the
circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the writing, other
than oral statements by the parties of what they intended it to mean, except where it
produces an ambiguous result, or is excluded by rule of law establishing a definite
meaning ..... This has been termed a primary rule of interpretation which is always
applicable, whether the writing seems clear or ambiguous ..... The underlying theory
is that as all language will bear "some different meanings," evidence of surroundings is
always admissible in the interpretation of integrated agreements, but not for the purpose of giving effect to an intent at variance with any meaning that can be attached to
the words ..... But, however this may be, the propriety of admitting evidence of extrinsic facts, where the meaning of the instrument is not clearly apparent, cannot be
gainsaid. Where, as here, general or indefinite terms are employed in the agreement,
the court may look into the attending circumstances, and avail itself of such light as
they may afford in ascertaining the true meaning of the language so used ..... In such
a situation the Court must regard the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which the contract was made, and the objects which the parties were thereby striving to accomplish. Such an inquiry is not for the purpose of changing the writing, but
to secure light by which to ascertain its actual significance ..... It must always be kept
in mind that, in an action on the contract, such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of interpreting the writing-not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the meaning to be given to the instrument.
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So far as the evidence tends to show not the meaning of the writing, but an intention
6
wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is irrelevant. 3

The only difference that might be said to subsist between the standards
occurring on the two sides of the fence here laboriously erected is that on
the one side "oral statements by the parties of what they intended to
mean" are explicitly excluded, whereas on the other side there is a reference to "the objects which the parties were thereby striving to accomplish." That apparent reference to actual intent, however, is dearly
negated by the further qualification that "so far as the evidence tends to
show not the meaning of the writing, but an intention wholly unexpressed
in the writing, it is irrelevant." It is such meaning as could, under the
circumstances, be reasonably attached to the writing that is sought in
all cases; to say that a writing is ambiguous simply means that it is
more difficult-or that a greater range of data is required-to indicate
for this writing than for some others what its language might reasonably
be expected to mean. But what Williston calls the secondary standard
for the first class of contracts is in fact the primary standard for the
second class; and if it is difficult to find a distinction between those two
standards within the first class of contracts, one may at least suspect the
clarity of the distinction as between the two classes.
As a matter of fact both the general statements of the two standards
and the maxims cited in the cases seem rather strikingly to collapse into
one principle with inessential variants in formulation. Consider Williston's formulation of the various standards. In contracts of the second
class the standard is one "of reasonable expectation, which would attach
to words or other manifestations of intention the meaning which the
party employing them should reasonably have apprehended that they
would convey to the other party."6 4 Now the application of such a standard will result, under some circumstances, in giving to language its general
or normal meaning. Sometimes, on the other hand, a local or trade or
technical or otherwise limited meaning may prevail, indeed, an even narrower meaning might seem to define, for certain words, what a person
would "reasonably expect another to understand" by them, but on the
one hand "mutual" meanings are generally excluded on grounds of policy,
and on the other hand it seems clear that they would in any case be admitted, not in so far as the parties actually intended to employ such
meanings, but in so far as such meanings correspond to the interpretation
which a third party under the same circumstances could reasonably attach
63 113 N.J.L. 6o5, 6og, 175 Ad. 55, 57 (1935).
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to the language used. In contrast to this relatively flexible standard, then
-which might result in the interpretation of language in its general,
local, or sometimes in a mutual or individual sense-we have for the first
class of contracts the rule that only one of the above meanings, namely
the local one, is to be given. For contracts in which there is an integration or a writing is required by law, the standard is one "of limited usage,
which would attach the meaning given to language in a particular locality,
or by a sect or those engaged in a particular occupation, or by an alien
population or those using a local dialect."6 s This standard, then, gives to
language one of the meanings which could be given to it under the less
specific standard of reasonable expectation. But how, in fact, does such
a standard operate? In the first place, Williston qualifies the statement
of the principle by the assertion that the difference between normal and
local standard is one of degree. 66 And it is clear that where the use of the

more general meaning causes no difficulty, the court will not go out of
its way to look for some dialect or trade usage which must be substituted
for what is for all concerned a perfectly satisfactory interpretation. If
A contracts to buy B's white house, and there is no evidence that white
house is in the language of the real estate business or the dialect of A's
or B's sect or locality anything but what is usually called white in the
normal English language, the court will not strain itself to discover a
usage in the textile trade or some other place or profession whereby
"white" means dark gray. Where it happens to be the normal rather
than a peculiarly local meaning of words that defines what the party
employing such words should reasonably have apprehended that they
would convey to the other party, it is surely such a general meaning that
will prevail. Conversely, moreover, the Restatement in its discussion of usage
declares that usage is inoperative "if either party knows or has reason
to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent with the
usage."'6 7 That is to say: if, and only if, evidence of usage contributes to
the determination of the meaning which a person employing certain
words could reasonably have expected them to convey to another person,
is such evidence relevant. The local meaning is given to words if, and only
if, such meaning can be reasonably given; where that is not the case the
general meaning is used-or even, where policy allows, a mutual meaning.
To say, in other words, that a "standard of limited usage" is employed
for agreements where a writing has been adopted, is to say that in many
cases the application of the standard of reasonable expectation has the
6s3 Williston, Contracts §§ 603, 607 (rev. ed.
3 Wiliston, Contracts § 603 (rev. ed. x936).

1936); Rest., Contracts §§
67Rest.,

227, 230 (1932).
Contracts § 247 (1932).
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result of attaching "the meaning given to language in a particular locality,
or by a sect or those engaged in a particular occupation, or by an alien
population or those using a local dialect." The relationship is evident in
Williston's own statement: "In applying the standard of limited usage
to integrations, the inquiry of the court should be-What was the meaning of the writing at the time and place it was made between persons of
the kind or class who were parties to it? 6' In other words: what, under
these circumstances of linguistic custom, would a reasonable person have
expected another to understand by the language he employed? There
thus appears to be no need, as Williston finds, for contradicting such unrestricted expressions of the standard of reasonable expectation as the
cases actually present. In Gates v. Megargel,for instance, it is said that "a
writing is to be interpreted in the sense in which the maker knew or had
reason to know it would be understood by the party to whom he tendered
it.'69 Similarly, it was said by Blackburn, J., in Fowkes v. Manchester etc.
Ass'n:
There are rules of construction which, though they may be cited on both sides,
furnish principles for our guidance; and one of those rules is, that in all deeds and
instruments the language used by one party is to be construed in the sense in which it
would be reasonably understood by the other.70
Such maxims-and especially the latter, which omits any reference to
actual understanding-seem to express simply and adequately the standard actually applied to all agreements. Nor do they contradict the dicta
which announce a preference for the local as against the normal standard,
since, as we have seen, such a preference results, in a given case, from the
specific application of the more general principle.
This conclusion is unfortunately obscured, it seems to me, by the addition to Wigmore's four "standards" of an additional standard which is
in fact of a radically different order. 71 It would in fact be preferable to
693 Williston, Contracts § 617 (rev. ed. 1936).
69Gates v. Megargel, 266 Fed. 811, 818 (C.C.A. 2d 1920).
703 B. &S. 917, 929 (1863) (It may be objected that Blackburn is here stating the standard
of reasonable understanding, as distinguished by the Restatement § 227 from the standard of
reasonable expectation. That distinction seems, however, to be a very artificial one-for surely,
since "reasonable expectation" is expectation of "reasonable understanding," it may be said
that to construe the language of one party in the sense in which it would reasonably be understood by a second party in effect is the same as to construe it in the sense in which the first
party should reasonably expect that it would be understood by the second party. The relational field to be analyzed is the same, whether the relation of reasonable expectation or its
converse, reasonable understanding, be employed as the instrument of analysis.) McMillin v.
Titus, 222 Pa. 500, 72 Atl. 240 (i9o9); Ardis v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 2oo Mich. 400, 167

N.W. s (igi8).
7'3 Wiliston, Contracts § 6o3 (rev. ed. 1936); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2461

(2d

ed.

1923).
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reserve the title of "standard" for the additional principle, and to call
Wigmore's "standards" either so many "languages" or so many types of
"meaning" discoverable by the use of one standard. It is not always apparent, from words alone, in what language those words occur. The string
of signs "God Mad," for instance, might on the face of it be proclaiming
in head-line jargon a strange kind of relation between deity and insanity
or bad temper. The same string of signs, appearing on the window of a
Danish restaurant, has the same meaning as the English words "Good
food." Similarly, it is sometimes the case that within a given natural
language such as English the same signs have several different meanings
in different local or professional or sectarian or individual languages.
And in asking what a person using words at a given time and place
might reasonably expect another person to understand by those words,
one is asking, first of all, what language it is in which those words were
used-whether it is the general language English, or a language common
to a certain trade or locality or other well-established group, or a language
common to two or several individuals, or the language of one individual
alone. The meaning to be reasonably attached to words is, obviously,
the meaning attached to them in the language in which they are used,
not the meaning attached to them in some other language. The first
step in the search for the meaning reasonably to be attached to signs,
therefore, is the determination of the language to which the signs in question actually belong. Only after that step is it possible, by the formulation
of the dictionary and rules of that language, to proceed to the actual
determination of specific meanings-which will, of course, be relative to
the language in which, by the first step, the words have been found to
occur. What the standard of limited usage tells us, then, is, first, that the
language spoken in written instruments is often a local or otherwise limited
rather than a general one; and secondly, that, in so far as that is the case,
the meaning given to words by the application of the standard of reasonable expectation will often be, correspondingly, local or limited rather
than "normal."
III
The need for a multiple standard, it was suggested at the opening of
the preceding section, is sometimes presented as a function of the "wellsettled" rule that parol evidence cannot be introduced to alter the terms
of an integrated agreement. We discovered, however, not only that it
was extremely difficult to locate satisfactorily a clear line between the
two classes of contracts thus created; but that when the parol evidence
rule is taken to exclude evidence of actual intention rather than all ex-
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trinsic evidence it seems merely to be excluding what is irrelevant in any
case for purposes of interpretation. It thus appears that the problem is
created not so much by the exclusion of evidence of intent in certain
cases as by the insistence of the courts that actual intent has something
to do with the matter in the first place; and it would be well, therefore,
to examine more explicitly, in conclusion, the dictum that "the object of
construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties." 2
Language is, as Wigmore says, in some sense "subjective and personal." 73 The question is whether it is the subjective or personal aspect
of language with which the law is concerned. And from the repeated assertions that the great object of interpretation is to get at the intent of
the parties it would certainly appear that it is. Even a theory of interpretation as "objective" as Williston's contains some hints that, while
unfortunately courts are obliged, for the sake of certainty, to construe
contracts in terms of expressed not actual intention, it is really actual
intent that is ultimately important.7 4 But the most emphatic statement
in this direction is Wigmore's:
So long as men are allowed to grant and contract freely, and so long as the law
undertakes to carry out those acts by enforcement, just so long must the standard of
interpretation continue to be mobile, subjective, and individual. Mr. Justice Brook
once thought it "barbarous" that a man should "be assured that whatever words he
made use of, his meaning only should be considered." But as the law of today has
broken with his premise, so it must break with his conclusion. The ordinary standard,
or "plain meaning," is simply the meaning of the people who did not write the document. The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or even can be some one real or
absolute meaning. In truth, there can only be some person's meaning; and that person, whose meaning the law is seeking, is the writer of the instrument.s

Or again:
There is no transaction whatever in which, for some idea or other, the parties do
not use words in a sense of their own. Having themselves locked up the idea in the
words, themselves must furnish the key to unlock it.76

It should be evident, however, from the considerations of the preceding
section, that if it is the purpose of the law to discover such subjective
meanings, it is a purpose the achievement of which is in practice never

even attempted. For even in cases beyond the magic circle of the parol
evidence rule the court endeavors to discover not what the parties meant
72Domeyer v. O'Connell, 364 Ill. 467, 4 N.E. (2d) 830 (1937).
735 Wigmore, Evidence § 2462 (2d

ed.

1923).

743 Williston, Contracts § 6o8 (rev. ed. 1936).

7s 5 Wigmore, Evidence §

2462 (2d

ed.

1923).

76Id.,

at § 2465.
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to say but what they can reasonably be understood to have said. That is
dear, for example, in the opinion in the Corn Exchange case cited above:
even where there is "ambiguity" it is a standard of reasonable expectation, not of subjective intention that is employed. It is dear even through
the vestiges of subjective language in a statement like that in Woburn
Nat'l Bank v. Woods:
A contract involves what is called a meeting of the minds of the parties. But this
does not mean that they must have arrived at a common mental state touching the
matter in hand. The standard by which their conduct is judged and their rights are
limited is not internal, but external. In the absence of fraud or incapacity, the question
is: What did the party say and do? "The making of a contract does not depend upon
the state of the parties' minds; it depends on their overt acts." It is elementary in the
law governing contracts of sale and all other contracts, that the agreement is to be
ascertained exclusively from the conduct of the parties and the language used when it
is made, as applied to the subject-matter and to known usages. The assent must be
mutual, and the union of minds is ascertained by some medium of communication.
A proposal is made by one party and is acceded to by the other in some kind of language mutually intelligible, and this is mutual assent. A person cannot escape the
natural and reasonable interpretation which must be put on what he says and does,
by showing that his words were used and his acts done with a different and undisclosed intention ..... It is not the secret purpose, but the expressed intention, which
must govern in the absence of fraud and mutual mistake. A party is estopped to
deny that the intention communicated to the other side was his real intention.77
But the principle is most dearly stated, perhaps, in the opinion of Blackburn cited above:
If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable
man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party,
and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with him, the man thus
conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other
party's terms.78
To assert as the object of construction, however, what is never actually
sought in construction is to establish between theory and practice a most
inconvenient relation, necessitating numerous apologies and reconstructions which would be eliminated were the theory built, initially, to account for the practice. As it is, in almost every statement of the rules of
interpretation, a sort of hankering after actual intent seems somewhere
to insinuate itself, with the effect of confusing what looked like a reasonably clear principle. "Our guide," says Cardozo in Bird v. St. Paul
F. & M. Ins. Co., "is the reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an ordinary business contract. It is his
7'77 N.H.

172, 177,

89 Ad. 491,

492 (1914).

78Smith v. Hughes, L.R., 6Q.B. 597, 607 (1871).
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intention, expressed or fairly inferred, that counts."' 79 So far, so good.
But he goes on to say: "The inquiry for us is how far the parties to this
contract intended us to go." The reasoning seems to be somewhat as
follows: we want to know the intention of the parties-just when they
actually expected the word in question to apply; but the parties are business men, presumably reasonable business men; therefore to get at their
intention we look for the linguistic usage of the reasonable business man,
which will reflect his intention and thus indicate to us indirectly the intention of the parties-since they are likewise reasonable business men.
As a matter of fact the situation is almost the reverse of that just described: we want to know the meaning of the words used; the parties are
business men, therefore we assume that the language used here is that of
business men; and we proceed to consider the rules of business language
in order to determine, what, in that language, the words in question
mean. The circumstances of the actual parties serve, for purposes of
interpretation, to identify the language in which the instrument is written;
once that is determined, the problem is simply how a reasonable man
speaking that language would understand the words in question. The
actual subjective intention of the parties has, for the purpose of construction, simply nothing to do with the matter. From this point of view,
therefore, a reference to the sense in which a party "knew or had reason
to know" his language would be understood is either redundant or erroneous. It is solely what he had reason to know that is relevant.
Significant symbols have at least three aspects. There is the subjective,
personal meaning of words of which Wigmore speaks: that is, the idea,
image, or feeling evoked in the individual mind by a certain symbol.
There is the empirical or semantical meaning of words, that is, their
reference to external things or events. And there is the formal meaning
of words, that is, their systematic connection with other words of the
given language. ° Problems concerning the third factor may arise in the
field of interpretation when there are apparent contradictions in an instrument needing resolution; for in general they are co-extensive with the
problems usually called "logical." But it is, as the much-cited case of
Doherty v. Hill suggests,"' the second kind of meaning that is of crucial
I
79 224 N.Y. 47, S , 12o N.E. 86, 87 (i918). The question is one of the interpretation of the
phrase "proximate cause" in a fire insurance policy.
so This division corresponds in part to the analysis of language of C. W. Morris. See:

Morris, Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism (1937), and Foundations
of the Theory of Signs, in Foundations of the Unity of Science (1938). Only a portion of his
"pragmatic" dimension is included in the "psychological" or subjective aspect of symbolism

referred to here.
81144 Mass. 465, I N.E. 58r (iS8i).
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importance for interpretation. And the first is, in contrast, a matter of
little if any importance for the law. That conclusion, in direct contradiction to Wigmore's theory, is stated in Justice Holmes' article on "The
Theory of Legal Interpretation," which presents, in its entirety, a dear
and authoritative answer to the perplexities raised at the opening of this
paper. Speaking of the admission of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of a document, Justice Holmes asks:
Is this trying to discover the particular intent of the individual, to get into his mind
and to bend what he said to what he wanted? No one would contend that such a
process should be carried very far, but, as it seems to me, we do not take a step in that
direction. It is not a question of tact in drawing a line. We are after a different thing.
What happens is this. Even the whole document is found to have a certain play in the
joints when its words are translated into things by parol evidence, as they have to be.
It does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws of language.
Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the
mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they
were used, and it is to the end of answering this last question that we let in evidence
as to what the circumstances were. But the normal speaker of English is merely a
special variety, a literary form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is
external to the particular writer, and a reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of the law.2
It remains to reconsider briefly our initial questions, as suggested by
the contradictory dicta of the Illinois cases.8 3 The first conflict, between
the maxim that "the great object is to arrive at the intention of the
parties" and the rule excluding evidence of such intention, is resolved by
the denial of one member of the inconsistent pair. The second question
concerned the relation between the principle that all extrinsic evidence
is excluded in construing a contract, and the principle that the court will
always endeavor, by extrinsic evidence, "to place itself in the position of
the parties." Here again the former principle seems, by the weight of
authority, to be flatly wrong. It should be added, however, in the light
of our conclusions, that the alternative rule likewise needs modification
in the direction of great objectivity. "In the construction of contracts
(not for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, but) for
the purpose of ascertaining the empirical meaning of the language used by
the parties, the court will endeavor, by extrinsic evidence of such facts
as the parties had in view, to place itself as nearly as possible in their
position, so that it may understand the language used (not in the sense
intended by them, but) in the sense in which a normal speaker of English
placed in such a position would understand such language or expect an''84
other to understand it.
8212 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (z899).
84 See Weger v. Robinson Nash Motor

81, 9z,
Co., 340 Ill.

83 Section I, supla.
172 N.E. 7, 11 (,930).

